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THE CONTRACT OF THE CORPORATE SURETY
AND ITS DISTINCTION FROM ONE
OF INSURANCE
G. Al. WEICHELT1
USTICE Lumpkin, in a Georgia case, referred to
suretyship as "a lame excuse for a thorough knowl-
edge of human nature."2
The law of suretyship, one of the oldest branches of
our jurisprudence, shrouded in the mists of antiquity,
is frequently referred to in the Old Testament. and was
well recognized and in common use in Abraham's time.
When Joseph, the adviser of the Pharaoh of Egypt,
demanded that his brother Benjamin be brought before
him before granting the requests of his other brothers,
they returned for Benjamin. Israel, the father, was
reluctant to allow Benjamin to go and Judah said, "I
will be surety for him." 3
The dangers and hazards incident to suretyship have
long been recognized. Solomon warned his people of
the need for extreme caution in undertaking to become
surety for another when he said, "He that is surety for
a stranger shall smart for it: and he that hateth surety-
ship is sure." 4
' General Attorney, National Surety Co.
2 Jones v. Whitehead, 4 Ga. 397.
3 XLIII Genesis 9.
4XI Proverbs 15.
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The Code of Hammurabi (2250 B. C.) refers to bonds
and securities and in one of the translations made by
Robert Francis Harper is the following quotation: "If
a man have bargained for the field, garden or house of
an officer, constable or tax gatherer and given sureties,
the officer, constable or tax gatherer shall return his
field, garden or house and he shall take himself the
sureties given."
There is ample proof that suretyship was practiced
by the Babylonians and Assyrians. John, in his able
treatise on Babylonian and Assyrian laws, refers to
surety for debts, for appearance, and for the appearance
of witnesses. In the time of King Darias we find "guar-
antee against theft," the forerunner of the modern
fidelity bond, and various other forms of suretyship fre-
quently referred to. Among them is the case cited where
"the seller warrants that if the slave prove to have cer-
tain undisclosed defects, vices or liabilities which would
detract from his value to the buyer, the seller will
indemnify the buyer and give surety therefor." Another
case cited in the translation is one for the appearance of
"L" and was known as "surety for the foot," meaning
that the principal would appear and discharge the debt.
Here "G" guarantees "for the foot" of "D" out of
the hand of "L". If he goes away "G" will pay thirty-
five Gur of dates.
The Greeks and Romans practiced suretyship exten-
sively and here, too, we find mention made of the dangers
of suretyship and that sureties frequently suffered
because of their undertakings. Among the mottoes of
the "Seven Wise Men of Greece," which were later
inscribed on the tablet at the Delphian Temple, the
fourth, attributed to Thales, a Greek sage and philoso-
pher who lived in about the Seventh Century, B. C., is:
"Suretyship is the precurser of ruin." When we realize
that one of the seven mottoes given this place of honor
in the Delphian Temple is devoted to the contractual
relation of suretyship, we can understand that it was
not only common and extensively practiced, but that its
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hazardous nature was even then understood through
experience. Similar examples are found in the Egyptian
laws, as well as other ancient codes.
Suretyship was practiced in England as far back as
we have any record. Merlin, a bard of the Sixth Cen-
tury, wrote: "To this accorded, bothe the kynge and
the lady and her frendes and the parents of the Duke,
and maden gode suretee, bothe on that oon part and
tother."
Shakespeare, in his writings, frequently refers to
surety bonds. In the "Merchant of Venice" a surety
bond plays a very important part and also introduces
the original Portia and her famous defense for the
surety.
Obligations were then strictly enforced and it was not
until the Statute of William and Mary, in 1697, 5 that
sureties were discharged upon making the obligee whole.
The law is now well settled that a contract of suretyship
is one of indemnity only 6 and no matter what the amount
of the bond may be, the obligee can only recover the
extent of the loss sustained.
However, the contract of suretyship, before companies
were formed to carry on a suretyship business, was
usually entered into for the benefit of the principal and
the obligee as a matter of accommodation. Dealing as
they do with the frailties of human nature, as well as
the unforeseen contingencies which affect business and
trade conditions, such contracts often work a great hard-
ship upon the surety and not infrequently bind him far
beyond the obligation anticipated when the contract was
made. One may well expect his principal to fulfill the
contract guaranteed, and the latter may be perfectly
sincere and honest, yet something may arise over which
neither has control-business depression, storm, famine,
sickness and the like-which was not considered nor
5 8 and 9 William & Mary, III, Sec. VIII (1697); Anno Actavo &
Nono Gulielmi III, CII, Sec. II-VIII.
6Davis v. Gillett, 52 N. H. 126; Salo v. Pacific Coast Casualty Co.,
95 Wash. St. 109.
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thought of when the contract was made. Such facts
naturally influence the court to consider sureties as
favorites of the law and not to be held beyond the strict
law of their contracts. 7 Their contracts were construed
strictissimi juris and, as announced by Swayne, J., in
Magee v. Manhattan Life Insurance Co.,8 a surety is
a favored debtor. His rights are zealously guarded both at
law and in equity. The slightest fraud on the part of the
creditor touching the contract annuls it. Any alteration after
it is made, though beneficial to the surety, has the same
effect. His contract, exactly as made, is the measure of his
liability and if the case against him be not clearly within it
he is entitled to go acquit.
The form of the contract has changed very little since
surety bonds were first written. It must be in writing,9
and it is usually called a surety bond. The bond given
by William Shakespeare, as principal, the Diocese of
Worcester, obligee, and Fulk Sandells and John Richard-
son, sureties, executed in 1582, is a striking example of
this. The defeasance clause is as follows:
The condition of this obligation ys suche, that if hereafter
there shall not appere any lawfull lett or impediment, by
reason of any precontract, consanguinitie, affinitie, or by any
other lawful meanes whatsoever, but that William Shagspere
one thone partie, and Anne Hathwey, of Stratford in the
Dioces of Worcester maiden, may lawfully solemnize matri-
mony together, and in the same afterwards remaine and
continew like man and wiffe, according unto the lawes in
that behalf provided: and moreover, if there be not at this
present time any action, sute, quarrel or demaund, moved or
depending before any judge, ecclesiastical or temporal, for and
concerning any suche lawfull lett or impediment: and more-
over, if the said William Shagspere do not proceed to solemni-
zation of marriadg with the said Anne Hathwey without the
7 National Mechanics' Banking Ass'n v. Conklin et al., 90 N. Y. 116;
Magee et al. v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 92 U. S. 93.
8 92 U. S. 93.
9 Ingersoll et al. v. Baker, 41 Mich. 48.
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consent of her frinds: and also if the said William do, upon
his owne proper costs and expenses, defend and save harmles
the Right Reverend Father in God, Lord John Bishop of Wor-
cester, and his offycers, for licencing them the said William
and Anne to be maried together with once asking of the
bannes of matrimony betwene them, and for all other causes
which may ensue by reason or occasion thereof, that then the
said obligation to be voyd and of none effect, or els to stand
and abide in fulle force and vertue.
The reason the wording of the undertaking is still in use
is that the obligation and the relationship of the parties
have not changed.
Because of the hazard assumed, usually without com-
pensation, men were naturally reluctant to become sure-
ties, notwithstanding that they were favorites in the law.
It became difficult to secure sureties when needed. Com-
mercial advancement and progress called the necessity
for sureties into being more frequently as trade inter-
course expanded. To meet this need corporations and
firms were organized for the purpose of becoming sure-
ties and guarantors on bonds. The first of these were in
England, and as far back as 1720 we find record of a
company organized for the purpose of executing fidelity
bonds.
I owever, corporate suretyship in this country, where
it has developed and grown to large proportions, is of
comparatively recent origin. The first company, which
is still in existence, was organized less than sixty years
ago. With such a large industry suddenly coming into
being, engaged in financial undertakings of all kinds, it
is only natural that the courts should be called on to
decide many questions involving these undertakings.
Surety companies in many respects resemble insurance
companies, especially in that they furnish indemnity for
a certain fixed rate or premium, and are frequently
referred to as insurance companies. They, too, because
of the nature of their business, are subject to legislative
control.
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It has long been the established rule, in the construc-
tion of contracts of insurance, that where ambiguities
exist because of the use of words of uncertain meaning,
they are construed liberally and most strongly against
the insurer,'0 and where a doubt or ambiguity exists, it
will be construed in favor of the insured and against the
company, every effort being to furnish indemnity, if
possible." In this regard, insurance contracts are not
sui generis, though often so considered.
In contracts of insurance, certain elements exist which
induce a construction favorable to the one party. For
instance, it is a well established rule of construction that
a contract is considered most strictly against the writer,
and in insurance contracts the policies usually are writ-
ten by the company. Then, too, forfeiture is abhorrent
to the courts, who endeavor to avoid it always. The
courts consider also the relationship of the parties as
such; usually on the side of the insurer there are skilled
minds, technically trained and pitted against untrained
minds in the particular venture.
The rule of construction of insurance contracts would
be the same in any other contract where the same ele-
ments are present. They are, to a large degree, present
in the contracts of compensated or corporate sureties,
and the same rule of construction has been applied to
their contracts -.1 2 It has been held that compensated or
corporate sureties cannot invoke the rule of strictissimi
juris allowed to personal or gratuitous sureties, 3 and as
to their contracts or undertakings, if there is room for
construction, the rules applicable to gratuitous sureties
are reversed.14
In reaching this conclusion, however, the courts have
frequently referred to the undertaking of a corporate
surety as a contract of insurance.' 5 In the case of Guar-
10 Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Kearney, 180 U. S. 132.
11 Palatine Ins. Co. v. Ewing et al., 92 Fed. 111.
12 American Surety Co. v. Pauly, 170 U. S. 133.
13 Cowles v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 32 Wash. 120.
14 Philadelphia v. Fidelity Deposit Co. of Maryland, 231 Pa. St. 208.
15 United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of
Dundee, 233 Ill. 475.
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anty Company v. Bank, 6 the court said, "The bond in
question must, we think, be regarded as an insurance
contract." Such expressions have led to endless con-
fusion. While surety companies may enter into con-
tracts whereby they virtually become insurers, there is
a wide difference between an ordinary contract of surety-
ship and one of insurance. Insurance is a contract
whereby one undertakes to indemnify another against
loss, damage, or liability arising from an unknown or
contingent event; whereas a contract of suretyship is one
to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another.
Obviously, the contract of suretyship is not altered
because made by a corporation for compensation.
The rules of construction applicable to insurance con-
tracts are applied to contracts made by corporate sure-
ties, but once the contract has been construed, the law
applicable to all contracts of suretyship applies. For
example, where a bond provides for certain antecedent
conditions to be performed by the obligee, the surety's
liability does not become fixed until compliance, notwith-
standing the surety was corporate and compensated,
17
and no amount of construction in favor of the obligee
will change this situation. Judge Wells M. Cook states
the rule to be,
If the accommodation and compensated surety make exactly
the same kind of contract, no court has yet gone so far as to
construe the contracts differently, merely because one was
corporate and compensated. Surety companies have been
classified with insurance companies for purposes of legislative
control, because of the similarity of their business methods,
but these statutes merely regulate the conduct of the business
and do not relate to the suretyship question involved.'
It was never the intent of legislatures to change the
contract of a surety company from one of suretyship
16 233 Ill. 475.
17Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar-
anty Co., 99 Md. 423.
18 Stearns', The Law of Suretyship, (Wells M. Cook, 3d ed.) p. 402.
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to one of insurance, nor was such the intent of the courts.
Reference to insurance contracts was made only for the
purpose of construction, and this rule of construction
"cannot be availed of to refine away the terms of the
contract expressed with sufficient clearness to convey the
plain meaning of the parties and embodying require-
ments, compliance with which is made the condition of
liability." " 9
Like insurance contracts, corporate surety contracts
may be considered as aleatory, though not gambling con-
tracts, and the courts have given similar protection to
surety companies against bad faith. For example, insur-
ance contracts are considered uberrima fides and are so
construed.20 For the same reasons corporate surety com-
panies may insist that their contracts be free from con-
cealment and fraud,2' and the rule of strict construction
in favor of the obligee is applied in like manner, as it
is in favor of the insured in an insurance contract.2 2 Yet
the courts will not go beyond the terms of the contract,
and where no ambiguity exists and the language is plain
and definite, contracts of a corporate surety will be
administered the same as any other written contract, the
rule of construction not being allowed to refine away the
true meaning and intent of the parties.23
19 Guarantee Co. of N. A. v. Mechanics; Savings Bank & Trust Co.,
183 U. S. 402. See also United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v.
Overstreet, 27 Ky. 248.
20McDonald v. Black's Administrator, 20 Ohio 185.
21 Copper Process Co. v. Chicago Bonding & Ins. Co., 262 Fed. 66.
22 Terwilliger v. Masonic Accident Ass'n, 197 Ill. 9.
23 Lesher v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 239 Ill. 502.
